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Abstract—BlockChain (BC) has attracted tremendous attention due to its immutable nature and the associated security and privacy
benefits. BC has the potential to overcome security and privacy challenges of Internet of Things (IoT). However, BC is computationally
expensive, has limited scalability and incurs significant bandwidth overheads and delays which are not suited to the IoT context. We
propose a tiered Lightweight Scalable BC (LSB) that is optimized for IoT requirements. We explore LSB in a smart home setting as a
representative example for broader IoT applications. Low resource devices in a smart home benefit from a centralized manager that
establishes shared keys for communication and processes all incoming and outgoing requests. LSB achieves decentralization by
forming an overlay network where high resource devices jointly manage a public BC that ensures end-to-end privacy and security. The
overlay is organized as distinct clusters to reduce overheads and the cluster heads are responsible for managing the public BC. LSB
incorporates several optimizations which include algorithms for lightweight consensus, distributed trust and throughput management.
Qualitative arguments demonstrate that LSB is resilient to several security attacks. Extensive simulations show that LSB decreases
packet overhead and delay and increases BC scalability compared to relevant baselines.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, BlockChain, Security, Privacy, Smart home.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
B LOCKCHIAN (BC) is an immutable timestamp ledger ofblocks that is used for storing and sharing data in a
distributed manner [1]. The stored data might be payment
history, e.g. Bitcoin [2], or a contract [3] or even personal
data [4]. In recent years, BC has attracted tremendous at-
tention from practitioners and academics in different disci-
plines (including law, finance, and computer science) due
to its salient features which include distributed structure,
immutability and security and privacy [5]. A recent survey
[6] has observed that BC is expected to impact at least 27
different industry sectors.
BC maintains a distributed digital ledger of transactions
that is shared across all participating nodes. New transac-
tions are verified and confirmed by other nodes participat-
ing in the network, thus eliminating the need for a central
authority. Appending a new block to the BC (referred to
as mining in literature) entails solving a computationally
demanding, hard-to-solve, and easy-to-verify puzzle. This
puzzle underpins a trustless consensus algorithm among
untrusted nodes. The computation resources required to
participate in the consensus algorithm can be very signifi-
cant, which restricts the number of blocks that can be mined
by a node and thus offers protection against malicious
mining of blocks. Solving the puzzle involves a process
which introduces randomness among nodes who wish to
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mine a new block (miners). Existing BC implementations
typically use one of the following consensus algorithms:
Proof of Work (POW) [7] or Proof of Stake (POS) [3].
POW demands high computational resources, while POS
demands both computational and memory resources to
solve a cryptography puzzle. All communication between
nodes is encrypted which protects against eavesdropping.
BC users employ changeable Public Keys (PK) that prevents
them from being tracked, thus ensuring their privacy.
BC was first introduced in a cryptocurrency known as
Bitcoin and since then has been widely used in other cryp-
tocurrencies known as altcoins [8]. In recent years, BC has
attracted attention in non-monetary applications including
but not limited to: sharing of healthcare data [4], securing
robotic swarms [9] and verifying proof of location [10]. In
this paper, we argue that BC is an effective technology for
overcoming the security and privacy challenges that emerge
from connecting billions of everyday devices to the Internet,
i.e., the Internet of Things (IoT). Conventional security and
privacy methods tend to be ineffective in IoT due to the
following challenges:
• Resource consumption: Most IoT devices have lim-
ited resources, including bandwidth, computation,
and memory, which is incompatible with the require-
ments of complex security solutions [11].
• Centralization: Current IoT ecosystems rely on cen-
tralised brokered communication models where all
devices are identified, authenticated and connected
through cloud servers. This model is unlikely to scale
as billions of devices are connected. Moreover, cloud
servers will remain a bottleneck and point of failure
that can disrupt the entire network [11].
• Lack of privacy: Conventional privacy preserving
methods rely on revealing noisy or summarized data
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2to the data requester [12]. In contrast, several IoT
applications require users to reveal precise data to
the Service Providers (SP) to receive personalized
services.
The various benefits afforded by BC technology as outlined
earlier in this section make it an attractive solution for
addressing the aforementioned problems in IoT. However,
existing instantiations of BC cannot be readily adopted in
the IoT context for the following reasons:
Complex consensus algorithms: The consensus algorithms
employed in BC (POW or POS) require significant compu-
tational resources which are far beyond the capabilities of
most IoT devices.
Scalability and overheads: In a typical BC implementation,
all blocks are broadcast to and verified by all nodes. This
leads to significant scalability issues since the broadcast
traffic and processing overheads would increase quadrati-
cally with the number of nodes in network. The associated
overheads are intractable as most IoT devices have limited
bandwidth connections (e.g. Low Power Wide Area Net-
works such as LoRa) and processing capabilities.
Latency: There is a non-trivial delay associated with
ensuring that a transaction is confirmed by nodes partici-
pating in the BC. For example, in Bitcoin, it can take up
to 30 minutes for a transaction to be confirmed. Most IoT
applications have stricter delay requirements e.g. a service
provider requesting data from a smart home sensor should
not have to wait for several minutes.
Security overheads: Some of the compute-intensive se-
curity mechanisms in conventional BCs provide protection
against double spending, which are appropriate for cryp-
tocurrency but not directly applicable in the IoT context.
Throughput: In BC, the throughput is defined as the
number of transactions that can be stored. Classical in-
stantiations of BC have limited throughput. For example,
Bitcoin throughput is 7 transactions per second. However,
the number of transactions in the IoT ecosystem would far
exceed such limits due to extensive interactions between
various entities.
In this paper, we propose a Lightweight Scalable BC
(LSB) for IoT security and privacy that addresses the above
issues. We use a smart home setting for illustrative pur-
poses but LSB is application agnostic and well-suited for
diverse IoT applications. The framework consists of two
main tiers namely, smart home and overlay. A transaction is
defined as the basic communication primitive for exchang-
ing information among any entities. To optimize resource
consumption, IoT devices in the local smart home utilize
a local private Immutable Ledger (IL) of local transactions,
that is structurally similar to BC but is managed centrally.
Symmetric encryption is used to encrypt transactions in this
tier. The overlay tier comprises of capable nodes, such as
SP servers, that collaboratively manage a public BC which
stores overlay transactions. To ensure scalability, the over-
lay nodes are organized as clusters and only the Cluster
Heads (CH) are responsible for managing the public BC.
We propose a lightweight consensus algorithm that limits
the number of new blocks generated by the CHs within a
tunable consensus period.
To reduce the computation overhead associated with
verifying new blocks that are to be added to the public BC,
LSB employs a distributed trust algorithm. Each CH accu-
mulates evidence about other CHs based on the validity of
new blocks that they generate. The number of transactions
in a new block that need to be verified is gradually reduced
as CHs accrue trust in each other. Finally, we propose a
Distributed Throughput Management (DTM) mechanism to
dynamically adjust certain system parameters to ensure that
the throughput of the public BC (i.e., the number of trans-
actions appended to the BC) does not significantly deviate
from the transaction load in the network. DTM ensures
that network is self-scaling, i.e., as the network grows in
size, more transactions can be appended to the public BC,
thus increasing the throughput. In LBS, the flow of data to
and from IoT devices is kept separate from the transaction
flow. Transactions are broadcast among the overlay nodes
while data packets are routed toward their destination. This
separation allows optimal unicast routing of data packets,
thus resulting in reduced delays.
The key contributions of this paper are summarized
below:
1) We present a comprehensive tiered framework
based on BC technology for preserving security and
privacy for IoT. We use a smart home setting as the
basis for presenting the work. However, our ideas
are application agonistic and are well suited to a
broad range of IoT applications.
2) Our instantiation of the BC, known as Lightweight
Scalable Blockchain (LSB), is tailored to meet the
specific requirements of IoT devices and applica-
tions. We incorporate a number of optimizations
which include a lightweight consensus algorithm,
a distributed trust method, a distributed through-
put management strategy and a separation of the
transaction traffic from the data flow.
3) We undertake a qualitative analysis of LSB against
12 relevant cyber attacks and outline the specific de-
fence mechanisms, which ensure that LSB is resilient
against all of them. Additionally, a risk analysis
is conducted to investigate the likelihood of the
attacks.
4) We conduct extensive simulations using Cooja and
NS3 to evaluate key performance parameters in-
cluding latency, processing time, and resilience
against cyber attacks. Our results justify various
design decisions made and demonstrate the efficacy
of the proposed optimizations.
This paper is a significant extension of the preliminary
ideas presented in our prior works [13], [14] including new
concepts, algorithms and extensive evaluations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The pro-
posed architecture and details of two tiers are discussed
in Section 2. An overview of transactions is discussed in
Section 3. Detailed security analysis and performance evalu-
ations are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses further
aspects of LSB. Section 6 presents a literature review on IoT
security and BC applications, and finally Section 7 concludes
the paper and outlines and future work.
32 LIGHTWEIGHT SCALABLE BLOCKCHAIN (LSB)
In this section, we discuss the overlay and smart home tiers
in detail. We begin by defining two fundamental concepts:
• Transaction: The basic communication primitive for
exchanging control information among any entities
is referred to as a transaction. As noted in Section 1,
the data flow is distinct from transactions.
• BlockManager (BM): BM is an entity that is responsi-
ble for managing the BC. This includes generation,
verification and storage of individual transactions
and blocks of transactions. BMs in the overlay and
smart home tiers have slightly different functions as
will be explained in the subsequent sections.
2.1 Overlay
Similar to Bitcoin, we assume that each node in the overlay
is known by a Public Key (PK). Nodes use a fresh PK to
generate each new transaction to ensure anonymity (dis-
cussed further in Section 4.1). The overlay, as shown in
Fig 1, is comprised of various entities, known as overlay
nodes, including the smart home (represented by the Local
BM (LBM), which will be introduced in Section 2.2), mobile
devices, Service Provider (SP) servers, and cloud storage
(used by smart home devices for storing data).
The overlay network could potentially consist of a large
number of nodes. Thus to ensure scalability, we assume
that the public BC is managed by a subset of the overlay
nodes. We assume that a clustering algorithm such as in
[15] is used to group nodes into clusters, with each clus-
ter electing a Cluster Head (CH). CHs are responsible for
managing the BC and are thus referred to as Overlay Block
Mangers (OBMs). Additionally, CHs process incoming and
outgoing transactions that are generated to or from their
cluster members. A node selected as a CH is expected to
remain online for an extended duration of time and to have
sufficient resources for processing blocks and transactions.
We assume that mechanisms such as those used in [16] for
managing CH failures are in place. Since the fundamental
tasks are performed by the CHs, LSB is unaffected by IoT
device dynamics, i.e., joining and leaving of devices.
Transactions generated by an overlay node are secured
using asymmetric encryption, digital signatures and cryp-
tographic hash functions (e.g. SHA256). Transactions in the
overlay can be further classified into (i) single signature trans-
actions which only contain the signature of the transaction
generator and (ii) multisig transactions which are signed
by both the transaction generator (requester) and receiver
(requestee). The majority of transactions in LSB are multisig.
The instance where single signature transactions are used is
discussed in Sections 3 and 5.
The structure of a multisig transaction is shown in Fig
2a. The first field is an identifier for the transaction while
the second field is a pointer to the previous transaction of
the same requester node. Thus, all transactions created by
a requester are chained together. This is followed by the
PK and signature of the requester and requestee. The latter
signature is appended when the transaction is received by
the requestee. The seventh field is the transaction output
and is set by the requester. The output field contains the
following 3 entries: (i) the total number of transactions
generated by the requester that have been accepted by the
requestee (ii) the total number of transactions rejected by
the requestee (iii) the hash of the PK that the requester
will use for its next transaction. The first two fields provide
historical information that is necessary for computing the
reputation of the requester, which is used in the distributed
trust algorithm outlined in Section 2.1.2. The last output
field is necessary for future verification of the requester,
since the overlay nodes change the PK used for generating
each new transaction. The final field in a multisig transac-
tion, i.e. ”metadata”, provides information about the desired
action (a detailed discussion is in Section 3) and the smart
home device which is the target of this action. A single
signature transaction has a similar structure but excludes
the requestee PK and signature, metadata, and outputs [0]
and [1] as only one overlay node is involved. Note that,
multisig and single signature transactions are organized as
separate ledgers since the respective outputs are different.
The key transactions in the overlay are as follows:
• Genesis: Each overlay node must first create a genesis
transaction which serves as the starting point for
its ledger in the public BC. The genesis transaction
generation is discussed in section 3.
• Store: An overlay node generates a store transaction
to store data in the cloud storage.
• Access: An access transaction is generated by an
overlay node to request stored data of a device, e.g., a
SP (requester) may request all data stored by a device
(requestee) for the past week.
• Monitor: A monitor transaction is generated by an
overlay node, e.g., a SP may wish to obtain real-time
data from a device.
In LBS, the data flow is kept separate from the transaction
flow. Thus, in response to an access or monitor transac-
tion, the requestee device sends the data to the requester
in a separate data packet(s) after it is confirmed that the
requester is authorised to access the data. Similarly, for the
store transaction the data created by the requester is sent
distinctly from the transaction. Unlike transactions which
are broadcast, the data packets are unicast and can be routed
along optimal paths through the overlay network using
routing protocols such as OSPF [17].
The overlay transactions are stored in the the public BC
that is managed by the OBMs. Each block in the BC consists
of two main parts namely, transactions and block header.
The block header contains the following: hash of the previ-
ous block, block generator ID, and signatures of the verifiers.
The hash of the previous block in the public BC ensures
immutability. If an attacker attempts to change a previously
stored transaction, then the hash of the corresponding block
which is stored in the next block will no longer be consistent
and will thus expose this attack. The ”block generator ID”
and ”signatures of the verifiers” fields will be discussed
later in this section. Similar to Bitcoin, multiple transactions
are grouped together and then processed as one block. A
block can store at most T max transactions. The value of
T max affects the BC throughput in a way that with a larger
T max, more transactions can be stored in a single block.
4Fig. 1. An overview of LSB.
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Fig. 2. a) Structure of the multisig transactions, b) Trust table.
When an OBM receives transaction Y, it first checks
whether the requestee of this transaction is contained within
its cluster. An OBM maintains a key list (essentially a simpli-
fied access control list) consisting of requester/requestee PK
pairs which indicates the requesters that are allowed to send
transactions to specific requestees. This key list is updated
by a cluster member to give permission to other overlay
nodes to send transactions to it. A requestee may set the
requester value in the OBM key list as ”broadcast”, which
implies that it will receive all transactions that contain its
PK as the requestee PK. If the requester and requestee of
the incoming transaction Y match with an entry in the key
list, then the OBM sends the transaction to the requestee
(which is within its cluster and thus directly connected to
the OBM). If the requestee in Y does not belong to the OBM’s
cluster, then the transaction is broadcast to all other OBMs.
All pending transactions are stored in a transaction pool
at each OBM. When the size of the running pool becomes
equal to T max the OBM starts the process of creating a
new block using a consensus algorithm.
2.1.1 Consensus algorithm
As noted in Section 1, in LSB, we propose a time-based
consensus algorithm in place of the more resource-intensive
alternatives such as PoW and PoS that are typically used in
BC. The consensus algorithm must ensure a block generator
is selected randomly among nodes and is limited in the
number of blocks it can generate. To introduce randomness
among block generators, each OBM must wait for a random
time, known as waiting-period, prior to generating a new
block. Since the waiting-period differs for each OBM, an
OBM might receive a new block created by another OBM
that contains some or all of the transactions that are cur-
rently within the pool of transactions of the OBM. In this
instance, this OBM must remove these transactions from its
pool as they are stored in the BC by another OBM. Requiring
OBMs to wait for a random time also reduces the number of
duplicate blocks that can be generated simultaneously. The
maximum waiting-time is capped at twice the maximum
end-to-end delay in the overlay network. When a new block
is generated, it is broadcast to all other overlay nodes so that
it can be appended to the BC.
To protect the overlay against a malicious OBM that
may potentially generate a large number of blocks with
fake transactions leading to an appending attack (discussed
in Section 4.1), the periodicity with which an OBM can
generate blocks is restricted such that only one block can
be generated over an interval denoted by consensus-period.
The consensus-period is adjusted by Distributed Through-
put Management (DTM) and is discussed in Section 2.1.3.
The default (and maximum) value for consensus-period
is 10 minutes, which is similar to the mining interval in
Bitcoin. The minimum value of consensus-period is equal
to twice the maximum end-to-end delay in the overlay, to
ensure that there is sufficient time for disseminating a new
block generated by other OBMs. Each OBM monitors the
frequency with which other OBMs generate blocks. Any
non-compliant blocks are dropped and the trust associated
with the responsible OBM is decreased as outlined in the fol-
lowing sub-section. To prevent OBMs from always claiming
to have a short waiting-period, the neighbor OBMs monitor
the frequently that an OBM generates new blocks in the
begening of the waiting-period. If the number of such blocks
exceeds a threshold, defined based on application by the
BC designers, the OBMs drop the block generated by their
neighbor.
52.1.2 Verification
An OBM must validate each new block that it receives from
other OBMs prior to appending it to the BC. To validate
a block, the OBM first validates the signature of the block
generator. It is assumed that each OBM uses a pre-defined
key for generating blocks and it is assumed that these keys
are known to all other OBMs [18]. Next, each individual
transaction in the block is verified. A block is considered to
be valid if all transactions contained in the block are valid.
Algorithm 1 outlines the procedure for verifying an in-
dividual transaction, X. Recall that in the public BC all mul-
tisig transactions generated by each requester are organized
in a separate ledger. The output of the multisig transactions
creates a reputation metric for the requester. As discussed
in Section 2.1, the link between successive transactions is
established by including the hash of the PK that will be
used by the requester for the next transaction in the third
output field of the current transaction. Thus, the OBM first
confirms this by comparing the hash of the requester PK in X
with output[2] of the previous transaction of this requester
(lines 1,2). Following this, the requester signature, that is
contained within the fourth field of X, is verified (also
called redeemed) using its PK in X (lines 4,5). Recall from
Section 2.1 that output [0] and output [1] are used to create
reputation for the requester node. Initially, the requester sets
these outputs (based on its history of transactions) in the
multisig transaction. If the requestee accepts the transaction,
then it would increase the output [0] by one. Otherwise, the
requestee increases the output [1]. To protect the BC against
nodes that claim false reputation by increasing their outputs
before sending them to the requestee, in the next step of
transaction verification, the OBM checks that only one of
X’s outputs, i.e. either the number of successful transactions
(i.e. output [0]) or the number of rejected transactions (i.e.
output [1]), is increased only by one (lines 8,9). Following
this, the requestee signature is verified using its PK in X
(lines 11,12). If the steps complete successfully, X is verified.
Algorithm 1 Transaction verification.
Input: Overlay Transaction (X)
Output: True or False
Requester verification :
1: if (hash (X.Requester-PK) 6=X−1.output[2]) then
2: return False;
3: else
4: if (X.requester-PK redeem x.requester-signature) then
5: return False;
6: end if
7: end if
Ouput validation :
8: if (X.output[0] - X−1.output[0]) + (X.output[1] - X−1.output[1])> 1) then
9: return False;
10: end if
Requestee verification :
11: if (X.requestee-PK redeem x.requestee-signature) then
12: return true;
13: end if
Verifying all transactions and blocks is computationally
demanding, particularly when the number of nodes in the
overlay network increases. In the IoT context, one can ex-
pect serious scalability issues since the number of nodes
is expected to be very large. To address this, LSB uses a
distributed trust algorithm that gradually reduces the number
of transactions that need to be verified in each new block
as OBMs build up trust in one another. The algorithm
introduces the notions of direct and indirect evidence as
follows:
Direct evidence: OBM A has direct evidence about OBM B
if it previously verified at least one block that was generated
by B.
Indirect evidence: If OBM A does not have direct evidence
about OBM B, but if one of the other OBMs has confirmed
that the block generated by B is valid, then A has indirect
evidence about B.
Each OBM maintains a list that records pertinent in-
formation to establish direct evidence. For this, the OBM
records the number of blocks it has validated for every
other OBM. Recall from Section 2.1.1 that an OBM might
create blocks which are non-compliant with the consensus
algorithm. Other OBMs that receive a non-compliant block
will drop the same and decrement the direct trust associated
with the responsible OBM by one. If the malicious OBM
continues with this behaviour, its trust rating would be cor-
respondingly reduced. This implies that more and more of
its transactions will have to be verified by the other OBMs.
For indirect evidence, the OBM checks the number of other
OBMs that have verified a received block generated by an
OBM. The core idea behind the distributed trust algorithm
is that the stronger the evidence an OBM has gathered
about the OBM generating the new block, fewer transactions
within that block need to be verified to validate the block.
A trust table, an example of which is illustrated in Fig
2b is maintained by the OBMs to implement this strategy.
Direct evidence takes precedence over indirect evidence. If
the OBM has direct evidence about the block creator, then
a fraction of the transactions within the block are selected
to be validated as per Fig 2b. In the case that there is
no direct evidence, the OBM checks if indirect evidence is
available and then selects a different fraction of transactions
based on how many other OBMs have vouched for the
block generator as per Fig 2b. Note that, a certain fraction
of transactions are always verified even if there is strong
evidence to protect against a potentially compromised OBM.
If no evidence is recorded, then all transactions in the block
are verified.
2.1.3 Distributed Throughput Management (DTM)
The classical consensus algorithms used in BC limit the BC
throughput, which is measured as the number of transac-
tions stored in the BC per second, as solving the crypto-
graphic puzzle is computationally demanding. For instance,
Bitcoin BC is limited to 7 transactions per second because
of POW [2]. For IoT, such limits would be unacceptable,
since there would be numerous interactions (and thus
transactions) between various nodes. In LSB we propose
a Distributed Throughput Management (DTM) mechanism
(outlined in Algorithm 2 below) to actively monitor the BC
utilization and make appropriate adjustments to ensure that
it remains within an acceptable range. At the end of every
consensus-period, each OBM computes the utilization (α) as
the ratio of the total number of new transactions generated
to the total number of transactions added to the BC. Note
that, since all transactions and blocks are broadcast to all
OBMs, the utilization computed by all OBMs should be
similar. The aim of DTM is to ensure that α remains within
a certain desirable range (αmin, αmax).
6Algorithm 2 Distributed Throughput Management.
Input: α
1: while true do
2: if ( α > αmax) then
2: compute consensus-periodnew from Equation 1 with α =
αmin+αmax
2
3: if (consensus-periodmin <= consensus-periodnew ) then
3: update consensus-period to consensus-periodnew
4: else
4: reset consensus-period to default value
4: compute M from Equation 1 with α = αmin+αmax2
4: recluster overlay
5: end if
6: end if
7: if ( α < αmin) then
7: compute consensus-periodnew from Equation 1 with α =
αmin+αmax
2
8: if ( consensus-periodnew <= consensus-periodmax) then
8: update consensus-period to consensus-periodnew
9: else
9: reset consensus-period to default value
9: compute M from Equation 1 with α = αmin+αmax2
9: recluster overlay
10: end if
11: end if
12: end while
Assuming a network with N nodes of which M are
OBMs and R representing the average rate at which a
node generates new transactions per second (R can be
estimated from the total number of transactions generated
in the consensus-period), the utilization can be represented
as follows:
α =
N ∗R ∗ Consensus− period
T max ∗M (1)
The above equation suggests that there are two ways by
which the utilization can be adjusted: (i) changing the
consensus-period, which dictates the frequency with which
blocks are appended to the BC; or (ii) changing M , as each
OBM can generate one block within the consensus-period.
The latter approach incurs significantly greater overheads
as it requires reconfiguration of the entire overlay network
(see Section 2.1). Thus, if α exceeds αmax, in the first
instance, DTM checks whether the consensus-period can
be reduced. If so, then the new value for the consensus-
period is computed using Equation 1 and assuming that α
is equal to the mid-point of the desired range (αmin, αmax),
which ensures a stable operating point for the network (line
2-3, Algorithm 2). On the contrary, if the consensus-period
cannot be reduced then the network needs to be reclustered
with a new value forM (line 4). This new value is computed
using Equation 1, with α again set to the mid-point of the
desired range and the consensus-period set to the default
value, which is consensus-periodmax. This feature allows LSB
to scale well, where an increased number of participating
nodes delivers higher throughput. We reset the consensus-
period to default value as it would otherwise remain un-
changed at the minimum threshold and thus always require
network reconfiguration if the utilization increased above
its threshold.
In the instance when the utilization drops below αmin
an inverse approach is adopted, i.e. DTM first attempts to
increase the consensus-period, otherwise it decreases the
number of OBMs (lines 7 - 9, Algorithm 2).
To ensure that all nodes are consistent about the action
to be taken (whether it be changing the consensus-period or
M ), each OBM waits for a random duration and broadcasts
a message specifying the action to be taken to all other
OBMs. A recipient OBM checks whether the action is con-
sistent with its decision. If so, it signs the original message
and broadcasts it to other OBMs. If not, then it creates
a fresh message specifying its action and broadcasts it to
other OBMs. The action message that receives signatures
from more than half the number of OBMs is assumed to
be agreed-upon decision which all OBMs must follow. Note
that, in most instances the actions taken by all nodes will
be consistent. However, occasionally there may be slight
discrepancies in the OBMs estimate of the number of gener-
ated transactions due to packet loss or latency issues, which
may in turn lead to minor differences in the computed
consensus-period or M . In the rare event that there is no
clear majority, the OBMs employ an election method such as
in [19] to reach a final agreement about the new consensus-
period.
In the event where the number of OBMs are to be
changed, the network is reclustered using the same clus-
tering method used initially as discussed in Section 2.1.
2.2 Smart home
The smart home is comprised of a variety of IoT devices
which are managed by a Local BM (LBM). Since IoT de-
vices are typically resource-constrained, local transactions
are encrypted using symmetric encryption, for which a
shared key is established between the two parties, and use
lightweight cryptographic hash function, such as in [20].
In each smart home, the LBM centrally manages the local
Immutable Ledger (IL) which is similar in structure to a BC,
and processes local transactions and overlay transactions
that are generated to or from the smart home. The LBM
could be integrated with the Internet gateway or a stand-
alone middlebox such as F-secure [21] which acts as an
intermediary between the IoT devices and the gateway. The
LBM uses the generalized Diffie-Hellman [22] key distribu-
tion method to generate and distribute a shared key between
two local entities that are permitted to share data based on
the policy header in local IL which is discussed later in this
section.
The local IL records all local transactions and the overlay
transactions for which the requestee is the LBM. As shown
in Fig 3, each block in the local IL contains a block header
and a policy header. The block header maintains the hash
of the previous block to ensure immutability similar to the
public BC as discussed in Section 2.1. The policy header
is in the form of an Access Control List (ACL), which
defines rules for processing local and overlay transactions.
As shown in the right corner of Fig 3, the policy header
has four parameters. The ”Requester” refers to the ID of the
entity that generates the transaction. For incoming overlay
transactions which are mutisig transactions, this should be
the PK of the requester. For local transactions this refers to
the specific IoT device (see Fig 3 for an example). The second
parameter in the policy header, indicates the permitted
action (contained in the metadata of the transaction), which
can be one of the following: store locally, store cloud, access,
monitor, and monitor periodic. The third parameter specifies
the target device.
7Fig. 3. The structure of the local Immutable Ledger (IL).
All transactions are stored in the transaction part of IL
for auditing. For each transaction, five fields are stored as
shown in the left side of Fig 3. The first field is a pointer to
the previous transaction of the same device which creates a
chain of transactions for that specific device used by LBM
for auditing and authentication. The second field is the
transaction identifier. The third field is the device ID. For
local transactions, this is the ID of the device that generates
the transaction. For the overlay transactions, this is the ID
of the device whose data is requested (by the requestee)
and is extracted from the metadata field of the received
overlay transaction. ”Transaction type” refers to the type of
transaction (will be discussed in Section 3). If the transaction
is sent by an overlay node, then the hash of the transaction,
i.e. the transaction ID, is stored in the fifth field so that it can
be used to refer to the transaction in the public BC.
Each smart home is equipped with a local storage repos-
itory which is a device such as a backup drive that is used
by smart home devices to store data locally. This storage can
be integrated with the LBM or it can be a separate device.
It is assumed that the local storage is secure. Assuming
that a smart device is allowed to store data to the local
storage (which is verified by checking the policy header),
the LBM generates a shared key that is used by the device
to authenticate with the storage.
3 OVERVIEW OF TRANSACTIONS
Having discussed the details of each tier, in this section
we discuss the interactions between these tiers which is
facilitated by different types of transactions.
3.1 Local transactions
Transactions exchanged between entities that belong to the
same smart home are referred to as local transactions. Local
transactions are encrypted by a shared key between the
two entities involved in the transaction. The LBM gener-
ates shared keys for devices, using the generalized Diffe
Hellman protocol [22], after seeking approval of the home
owner. To deny permission, the LBM marks the previously
distributed key as invalid by sending a control message to
those entities that use the key for their transactions. Local
transactions are:
Genesis transaction: Each device first requires a genesis
transaction in the local IL. The LBM generates a shared key
to encrypt communications between the device and the LBM
and stores this key in the genesis transaction.
Store locally: Initially, the device that demands to store
data locally sends its request to the LBM. The LBM gener-
ates and distributes a shared key between the device and
the local storage. Local storage uses the shared key for
authentication. For further communications, the device and
the storage communicate directly using the shared key.
Data exchange: Each device inside the smart home may
request data from another internal device to offer certain
services e.g. the light sensor requests motion sensor data to
turn the light on when someone enters home. To achieve
the home owner control over local communications, first a
shared key should be allocated by the LBM to the devices
that request to share data. After receiving the key, devices
communicate directly as long as the key is valid.
3.2 Overlay transactions
Transactions in which the transaction generator (requester)
and the transaction receiver (requestee) are both overlay
nodes are referred to as overlay transactions. Recall that
asymmetric encryption is used for overlay transactions. The
key overlay transactions are as follows.
Genesis transaction: Each overlay node must first create a
genesis transaction in the public BC. In the overlay tier, the
genesis transaction is initiated by the overlay node using
one of the following approaches:
• Certificate authorities: In this approach, the node re-
lies on the widely deployed Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) [23] in the Internet. The overlay node contacts a
trusted Certificate Authority (CA), which ratifies the
node’s PK by attaching a signed certificate. The node
includes the certificate in the genesis transaction. To
verify the transaction, an OBM verifies the certificate.
It is assumed that the OBMs have access to a list of
trusted CA root certificates for verification (similar to
browsers and OSes).
• Burn coin in Bitcoin: Alternatively, if the node does
not wish to rely on PKI, then it can privately create
a genesis transaction by burning Bitcoins [24]. The
node creates a permanent transaction in the Bitcoin
BC by destroying a specified amount of coins (that
can be defined as a design choice), which is referred
to as ”burning coins”. The address of the burn trans-
action is used as the input of the genesis transaction.
The overlay node creates a genesis transaction with
the same PK as the burn transaction and sends it to
the OBM whose cluster it belongs to. If the genesis
transaction generator is an OBM, then it broadcast
8the transaction to other OBMs. To verify the received
genesis transaction, the OBM matches the PK of the
genesis transaction with the PK of the burn transac-
tion in the Bitcoin BC. Next, the OBM verifies the
signature in the genesis transaction.
In both approaches after verification, the OBM broadcast the
genesis transaction to other OBMs to be stored in the public
BC.
Store cloud: We assume that a user who wishes to store
his data, e.g. smart thermostat data, in the cloud has created
an account with a cloud storage provider (e.g., Dropbox,
OneDrive, etc.) out-of-band (i.e. independent of LSB). We
assume that the user creates a public/private key pair for
this cloud storage account and that the corresponding public
key is used in subsequent store cloud and access transac-
tions. Recall that LSB creates a clear distinction between the
control plane and the data plane to ensure that the data
packets can be routed efficiently through the network. To
facilitate this, we assume that the LBM of the user sends a
request during the initial setup to the cloud storage with the
aforementioned PK. Upon authentication, the cloud storage
sends the ID of its OBM to this LBM. Subsequently, all data
being stored in the cloud can be directly routed to the cloud
(as discussed in Section 2.1). The flow of events for the store
cloud transaction are shown in Fig 4. The device that wishes
to store data in the cloud sends a store cloud transaction
to the LBM (S1 in Fig 4). After authorization (S2) the LBM
sends data with the OBM ID of the cloud to its own OBM.
The OBM then routes data directly to the cloud storage
using routing protocol. After storing data, the cloud storage
signs the received transaction from the LBM and sends it to
its own OBM to be stored in the BC (S4).
Access and monitor: The flow of access and monitor
transactions are shown in Fig 4. For both transactions, the
requester generates and sends the transaction to its OBM
(A1, M1 in Fig 4). The OBM checks the keylists to find a
match and if not then broadcast the transaction to other
OBMs (A2, M2). By finding the match, the OBM forward
the transaction to the LBM (A3, M3). The fourth step differs
for access or monitor transaction. For access transaction, the
data is fetched from either the local or cloud storage (A4),
while for monitor transaction the real time data is requested
from the device (M4). After receiving data, the LBM routes it
to the requester (A5, M5). Recall that the data flow is routed
directly and separate from the transaction flow. Finally, the
LBM signs the received transaction from the requester and
sends it to its OBM to be stored in the public BC (A6, M6).
4 EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section we provide qualitative security and privacy
analyses as well as quantitative performance evaluation.
4.1 Security and privacy analysis
In this section, we discuss LSB security, privacy, and fault
tolerance. It is assumed that the adversary (or cooperative
adversaries) can be the OBM, a device in the smart home, a
node in the overlay network, or the cloud storage. Adver-
saries are able to sniff communications, discard transactions,
create false transactions and blocks, change or delete data
in storage, analyze multiple transactions in an attempt to
deanonymize a node, and sign fake transactions to legit-
imize colluding nodes. We assume that standard secure
encryption methods are used in the smart home and overlay
tiers, which cannot be compromised by adversaries.
Security: Table 1 summarizes the various mechanisms
that allow LSB to meet key security requirements.
In Table 2 we summarize 12 specific security attacks
to which IoT networks or BCs are particularly vulnerable
and outline how LSB protects against them. In Table 2 we
also analyse how resilient LSB is against each attack and
the likelihood of the attack to happen based on European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [25] risk
analysis criteria. These criteria evaluate each attack based on
the following five metrics: i) time: the cumulative time for an
attacker to first detect a vulnerability, and subsequently plan
and launch a successful attack, ii) expertise: the generic ex-
pertise that the attacker must possess about the underlying
principles in order to orchestrate the attack, iii) knowledge:
specific information that is available about the target system,
e.g., security configuration, iv) opportunity: the duration and
nature (e.g., continuous or intermittent) of access to the sys-
tem needed for launching the attack, v) equipment: software
and/or hardware necessary for conducting the attack. LSB
exhibits beyond high resistance to seven attacks and high
resistance to three attacks. This suggests that LSB is highly
secure.
Privacy: LSB uses anonymity and user control to protect
the privacy of users in the overlay, smart home and the
cloud storage. Using changeable PKs as the identity of
overlay nodes introduces similar level of anonymity and
privacy as is experienced in other BC-based systems (e.g.
Bitcoin). In certain IoT applications, the two end points that
are communicating may need to know the real identity of
each other. For example, a home insurance company needs
to know the real identity of the owner of the smart home
that it is insuring. In these instances, the corresponding
transaction generator uses a unique PK to communicate
with each overlay node. Stored transactions in the public BC
are encrypted using the requestee PK to protect the privacy
of the overlay nodes against attackers who attempt to read
the data in metadata field of a multisig transaction (see Fig
2a).
In the smart home, the LBM enforces home owner poli-
cies to ensure his control over exchanged data, thus protects
his privacy.
The cloud storage is able to use the data of different
devices of an overlay node to find his real word identity.
To protect against this de-anonymization of devices, the
overlay node uses different credits to store the data of each
of its devices. This prevents the cloud to identify different
devices of the same overlay node.
Fault tolerance: Fault tolerance is a measure of how
resilient an architecture is to node failures. It is evident
from Section 2 that LBM and OBMs implement various
key functions and the failure of these nodes could thus
potentially impact the normal operation of LSB. The failure
of an LBM would disconnect the corresponding smart home
and the associated devices from the overlay. The smart
devices would be able to share data locally but would not
be able to store data in the cloud storage or communicate
9Fig. 4. The process of store, access, and monitor transactions.
TABLE 1
Security requirements discussion.
Requirement Employed method
Confidentiality Encryption (symmetric or asymmetric) is used for all transactions (Sections 2.1 and 2.2).
Integrity Each transaction includes a hash of all other fields contained in the transaction (Sections 2.1 and 2.2).
Availability 1) LBM processes all incoming transactions and controls access to all smart home devices, thus protecting them from
malicious requests, 2) An OBM sends a transaction to its cluster members only if a key contained in the transaction
matches one of the entries in its keylist (Section 2.1). This ensures that the cluster members only receive transactions
from authorized nodes.
Authentication In the smart home, the LBM creates a shared key between two communicating devices which is also used for
authentication (Section 2.2). In the overlay, each node should have a stored genesis transaction in the BC to be
authenticated. As transactions are chained to the genesis transaction, a node is authenticated when it has the private
key corresponding to the output PK of a transaction stored in the BC (Section 2.1). The cloud storage uses standard
authentication protocols.
Non-
repudiation
Overlay transactions are signed by the transaction generator to achieve non-repudiation. Additionally, all overlay
transactions are stored in the public BC, so neither requester nor requestee can deny their complicity in a transaction
(Section 2.1).
with other overlay devices.
In case an OBM leaves the overlay, the cluster members
associated with this OBM would not receive any service.
However, they can readily select a new OBM to associate
with. The OBM(s) departure may also affect the overlay
throughput as there are fewer OBMs to generate blocks.
However, the DTM mechanism outlined in 2.1.3 can handle
this situation. The departure of multiple OBMs may also
impact security due to the corresponding actions of the dis-
tributed trust mechanism. Recall from Section 2.1.2 that as
OBMs garner trust in one another, fewer transactions within
a block need to be verified. Thus, when multiple OBMs
leave, the probability of detecting a fake transaction in a
new block decreases as fewer OBMs remain in the network
to validate the new blocks. We will further elaborate on the
minimum number of OBMs required to participate in the
BC to prevent attacks in section 4.2.4.
4.2 Performance evaluation
In this section, we present extensive evaluations of various
performance aspects of LSB. We first explored the possibility
of using open source BC instantiations such as Ethereum.
However, these platforms are particularly suited for devel-
oping applications on top of the underlying BC substrate.
LSB has significant differences in its fundamental operations
in comparison to these BC instantiations. As a result, we
were unable to use these platforms for our evaluations and
thus chose to use simulations. We evaluate the smart home
tier and the overlay separately since these tiers operate in-
dependently, particularly when pertaining to performance.
Thus, we abstract over the details of one tier when studying
the performance of the other tier. We use the following two
simulators:
Cooja: We use Cooja [26] to study the performance of
the smart home tier. Cooja is well-suited for evaluating low
resource devices and benefits the availability of implemen-
tation of various IoT-aware protocols.
NS3: We use NS3 [27] to evaluate the overlay perfor-
mance as it has been widely used for analysing peer-to-peer
networks.
For the NS3 simulations, we consider a network consist-
ing of 50 overlay nodes. We assume the T max to be 10.
We assume five requesters generate four transactions per
second. The above settings are referred to as the default con-
figuration and are used in the simulations unless explicitly
noted otherwise.
In the rest of this section, we first evaluate the POW
processing time in Section 4.2.1. The smart home tier perfor-
mance is evaluated in Section 4.2.2. Next, we evaluate the
delay which an overlay node experiences while requesting
smart home data in Section 4.2.3. Distributed trust and its
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TABLE 2
Studying attacks on BlockChain.
Attack Definition Defence Resistant
to
attack
Attack
likeli-
hood
Appending
attack
Attacker compromises an OBM
and generates blocks with fake
transactions to create false rep-
utation
An OBM can detect a fake block during the verification step (see
Section 2.1.2) when it verifies the output and owner of the ledger
Beyond
high
Unlikely
Denial of
Service
(DOS)
attack
Attacker floods an overlay node
(target) with a large number of
transactions to overwhelm the
node such that it cannot de-
vote any resources to process
genuine transactions from other
nodes.
i) OBMs would not send a transaction to their cluster members
unless they find a match with an entity in their keylist, ii) Each
overlay node has a threshold for the maximum rate of transac-
tions received from the overlay. If the threshold is exceeded, the
keylist is updated to prevent nodes from sending transactions
to the target node. Details are discussed in Section 2.1.
High Unlikely
Distributed
DOS
(DDOS)
attack
This is a distributed version of
the above attack, where mul-
tiple overlay nodes or smart
home devices are compromised
by the attacker.
1) Infecting devices and overlay nodes is difficult due to usage of
OBM keylists and the fact that devices are not directly accessible
(see Sections 2.1,2.2); 2) In a smart home the LBM authorizes all
transactions prior to sending to the overlay (see Section 2.2); 3)
The overlay transactions are not valid within the smart home, as
different encryption methods are employed in the overlay and
the smart home (see Sections 2.1,2.2); 4) In the smart home, a
device can only communicate with another device if a shared
key has been established between them by the LBM (see Section
2.2). Finally, the methods that prevent DOS attacks in the above
row are also useful for mitigating DDOS.
Beyond
high
Unlikely
Device
injection
attack
Attacker introduces fake de-
vices to the smart home to gain
access to private information
within the home.
The injected device is isolated as local communications require
that the LBM has set up a shared key, which requires approval
from the home owner as discussed in Section 2.2.
Moderate Possible
Linking at-
tack
Attacker (that can be a SP or
cloud storage) links multiple
data in the cloud or transactions
in the BC with the same ID to
find the real world identity of
an anonymous node.
Overlay nodes use a unique PK for each transaction in the over-
lay. Each device is authenticated with the cloud using separate
accounts. This prevents the attacker from linking the data of
multiple devices of the same user.
Beyond
high
Unlikely
Dropping
attack
The OBM drops transactions to
or from its cluster members to
isolate them from the overlay
A cluster member can change the OBM it is associated with if it
observes that its transactions are not being processed.
High Unlikely
Modification
attack
Malicious cloud storage
changes or removes stored
data
The store transaction includes the hash of stored data, as shown
in Fig 4, that serves as evidence of when the data was stored or
last modified; however, data can not be recovered.
Beyond
high
Unlikely
False repu-
tation
An overlay node increases its
reputation by increasing out-
put[0] in each of its transactions
by more than one
OBMs detects false increase during the transaction verification
discussed in Algorithm 1.
Moderate Possible
Public BC
modifica-
tion
Attacker advertises a false
ledger of blocks and makes it
as the longest ledger. Thus, all
nodes accept the attacker ledger
as the true ledger.
The consensus algorithm limits the number of blocks that an
OBM can generate within a time interval. This will limit the
number of malicious blocks that an OBM can append, and thus
prevent the attacker from generating a longer ledger than the
true ledger. (see Section 2.1.1).
Beyond
high
Unlikely
Breaking
the time
interval
Malicious OBM generates
more than one block in each
consensus-period
Other OBMs would detect this as they would receive more
than the permitted number of blocks in a consensus-period
(see Section 2.1.1). Consequently, the trust rating for this OBM
would be decreased and it would be isolated from the rest of the
overlay.
Beyond
high
Unlikely
Consensus-
period
attack
The attacker(s) sends false re-
quests to update the consensus-
period
For a request to be considered valid, it must be signed by at least
half the number of OBMs. The likelihood of this is very low.
High Unlikely
51% attack The attacker controls more than
51% of OBMs and tries to com-
promise the consensus algo-
rithm by generating fake blocks
or more than the permitted
number of blocks
The attack can be detected during block verification (see Algo-
rithm 1) or by other OBMs based on consensus algorithm (see
Section 2.1.1).
Beyond
high
Unlikely
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effects on the overlay security and performance are studied
in Section 4.2.4. Finally, we evaluate DTM in Section 4.2.5.
4.2.1 POW processing time
In this part of evaluation, we aim to evaluate the time
consumed by an off-the-shelf device to solve the POW,
one of the widely used consensus algorithms in BC-based
systems [28]. We do so to highlight the ineffectiveness of
using classic BC and PoW in the IoT context. Each block in
the Bitcoin BC has a nonce attached to them. The miner is
required to search for the correct nonce such that the block
as a whole satisfies a certain arbitrary condition. Specifically,
it is required that the SHA-256 hash of the block have a
certain number of leading zeros. The only way to find the
correct nonce is by brute force. The number of leading zeros
controls the difficulty of solving the POW. The longer the
length of this sequence, the more resources and processing
time required to solve the puzzle. We implemented POW
using C++ on a MacBook Pro ( 2.7 Ghz Intel Core i5 pro-
cessor, 8 GB memory, and Intel Iris Graphics 6100 graphic
card) to study the processing time of solving the puzzle with
two difficulties. Typical IoT devices are significantly more
resource-constrained than a laptop so the results obtained
are conservative upper bounds that one can expect with IoT
devices. Solving PoW with 6 leading zeros takes 2.3 seconds.
Increasing the length of zeros to 7, increases the processing
time to 29.22 minutes. Currently, Bitcoin is using blocks with
17 zeros, which would take exponentially longer to solve on
a standard laptop. The results presented herein confirm that
solving the POW as used in Bitcoin incurs significant delays
on laptop class devices, thus validating our design choice of
eliminating PoW in LSB.
4.2.2 Smart home performance
We conduct simulations using Cooja to evaluate the energy
consumption and time overhead of the LBM. This is because
the LBM is the most resource consuming device in the smart
home since it handles all transactions and performs many
hashing and encryption (both symmetric and aymmetric)
operations. In contrast, the IoT devices have to perform very
simple tasks of which the most computationally intensive
is symmetric encryption. It has been shown [29] that most
IoT devices have sufficient capabilities to perform this task.
A complete evaluation of the smart home tier is provided
in our previous work [14]. In this paper, we present a
summary of these results. To compare the overhead of LSB,
we simulate another method that has the same transaction
flow as LSB, but does not use encryption, hashing, and local
IL. We refer to this as the ”baseline”. We use IPv6 over Low
Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) as the
underlying communication protocol in our simulation, since
it is well-suited to the resource constraints for a smart home
setting. We simulate three z1 mote sensors (that mimic smart
home devices) which send data directly to the LBM (also
simulated as a z1 mote) every 10 seconds. Each simulation
lasts for 3 minutes and the results are averaged over this
duration. A cloud storage is directly connected to the LBM
for storing data. To provide a comprehensive evaluation,
we simulate store and access transactions. For the store
transaction, we simulated two different and realistic traffic
flow patterns:
Periodic: In this setting, devices periodically store data
on the cloud storage (similar to a smart thermostat storing
temperature readings periodically in the cloud).
Query-based: Herein, the devices store data when they
received a query from the user, e.g. a home owner queries
a connected security camera to check whether anyone ap-
proached the door.
We evaluate the following metrics:
• Time overhead: Refers to the processing time for each
transaction in the LBM and is measured from when
a transaction is received at the LBM until the appro-
priate response is sent to the requester.
• Energy consumption: Refers to the energy consumed
by the LBM for processing transactions.
Time overhead: Fig 5 shows the results for the time over-
head. LSB consumes more time to process packets compared
to the baseline which can be attributed to the additional
encryption and hashing operations. In the worst case for
the query-based store transaction, the additional overhead
introduced by LSB is 20ms, which is still small in absolute
terms.
Energy consumption: Fig 6 outlines the energy consump-
tion results. As is evident, LSB increases the energy con-
sumption by 0.07 (mj). The table at the bottom of Fig 6 out-
lines the energy consumption for the 3 core tasks performed
by the LBM, namely: CPU, transmission (Tx), and listening
(Lx). The energy consumption by CPU increases by approxi-
mately 0.002(mj) in LSB due to encryption and hashing. LSB
results in longer packets (due to encryption and hashing),
which doubles the transmission energy consumption as
compared with the baseline. It should be noted that we
have assumed a 100% radio duty cycle in our evaluations
(i.e. the radio is always on). If the radio is switched off
intermittently to conserve energy, then the relative listening
overhead incurred by LSB would be higher. However, even
assuming a very aggressive duty cycle of 1%, the relative
increase in listening energy would still only be about 60%.
4.2.3 Accessing a smart home device from the overlay
In this section, we evaluate end-to-end delay experienced by
an overlay node for accessing or monitoring a smart home
device (e.g. when a home owner is remotely connected to
the overlay and wishes to monitor his security camera at
home). Delay is measured from the time since the request is
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generated till the response is received. We conduct simula-
tions using NS3 with the default configuration with 13 over-
lay nodes acting as OBMs. We compare LSB with a baseline
method which is consistent to current smart home offerings
on the market, where the requester directly communicates
with the LBM without the need for any of the transaction
processing that is part of LSB. The delay incurred using the
baseline method is 17.62 ms. On the contrary, with LSB,
the delay increases to 48.74ms. The higher delay can be
attributed to the fact that the transaction has to be broadcast
to other OBMs for verification. Each OBM incurs a delay
of 0.006ms for processing the transaction (the precise steps
are outlined in Section 2.1). However, this delay is relatively
insignificant.
As was noted in Sections 2.1 and 3, LSB separates the
data flow from the transaction flow. While transactions are
broadcast amongst the OBMs in the overlay, the data pack-
ets are forwarded towards the destination along optimal
paths as determined by a routing protocol such as OSPF.
To quantify the benefits of this design decision, we compare
LSB with a baseline method wherein both the transactions
and data packets are broadcast in the overlay network. We
use the default configuration and assume that one requester
sends four access transactions per second to a requestee. We
consider the following two performance metrics which are
best at capturing the impact of the separation between the
transaction and data flows: (i) end-to-end delay - similar to
above (ii) packet overheads - this captures the total number
of packets transmitted by OBMs for delivering the data
packets to the requester. Since, the size of the data and
transaction packets are different, we measure the latter as
the cumulative sum of all packet sizes in KBytes. Since,
these two metrics are affected by the number of OBMs in
the network, we vary the number of overlay nodes that
act as OBMs from 5 to 20. The results are presented in
Fig. 7. LSB incurs lower packet overhead and end-to-end
delay compared to the baseline since, in the latter the data
packets are broadcast among all OBMs as compared to the
former where the data packets are routed along optimal
paths. Observe that, for the baseline, both metrics grow
linearly as the number of OBMs increase. The amount of
broadcast traffic generated is directly proportional to the
number of OBMs which explains the linear increase in the
packet overhead. Since the data packets are now broadcast,
the delay incurred in receiving the data at the requester
also increases linearly. In contrast, with LBS only the packet
overhead increases with the number of OBMs. Since the data
packets are routed directly to the requester, the end-to-end
delay is not affected by the number of OBMs.
These results demonstrate the efficacy of keeping the
data and transaction flows independent of each other.
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4.2.4 Evaluation of the Distributed Trust Algorithm
Recall that in the classical BC, all transactions within a new
block must be verified by an overlay node. In contrast, LSB
uses a distributed trust algorithm wherein the number of
transactions that must be verified decreases gradually as
OBMs build up trust in each other (see Section 2.1.2). In this
experiment, we compare the processing time for validating
a new block in LSB with a baseline strategy that is similar to
classical BCs. We use the the default network configuration
and the trust table shown in Fig 2b. The simulation lasts
for 180 seconds and the results, shown in Fig 8, are the
average of 10 runs. The standard deviation is also shown,
except for the baseline where results are deterministic. We
measure the time taken by each OBM to validate a new
block and plot the average in Fig 8 (shown on the left
vertical axis). Note that, we disregard all other tasks (e.g.
checking key lists, generating new blocks, etc) other than
validation of new blocks in this evaluation as the former are
not affected by the trust algorithm. Fig 8 plots the processing
time as a function of the number of blocks successfully
verified (and thus appended to the BC) as the simulation
progresses. The percentage of transactions that need to be
verified (PTV) is shown on the right vertical axis. As can
be inferred from Fig 8, at start up, the processing time is
the same for both methods since the OBMs have yet to
garner trust in each other. However, as time progresses and
more blocks are generated and verified, the OBMs build
up direct trust in each other. Consequently, only a fraction
of the total transactions in a new block need to verified
in LSB, which reduces the processing time as compared
to the baseline, wherein all transactions within the block
are verified. Moreover, as the number of blocks verified
increases, progressively less transactions need to be verified
(also shown in Fig 8) as the trust in other OBMs continues
to increase. Once 50 blocks are generated, the trust among
OBMs reaches the highest level (see Fig 2b). From here on,
the number of transactions that need to be verified remain
fixed and so does the processing time. At steady state (i.e.,
when the network has been running for a substantial period
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of time), LSB achieves over 50% savings in processing time
compared to the baseline.
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In LSB, since only a fraction of transactions within a
block are verified, there is a chance that a fake transac-
tion created by malicious node may not be verified and
thus appended to the BC (referred to as appending attack
in Section 4.1). In the following, we evaluate the success
percentage of such an attack. Intuitively, the more OBMs in
the network, the lower the likelihood of a successful attack,
since the chance that the fake transaction will be picked for
verification increases. However, the packet overhead also
increases proportionally with the number of OBMs due to
the increase in the broadcast traffic. To study this trade-off,
we consider the default network configuration and vary the
number of overlay nodes acting as OBMs from 3 to 20. The
evaluation metrics are the attack success rate and the cumu-
lative packet overhead. To simulate the attack, we consider
the worst-case scenario, where a highly trusted OBM, which
has generated more than 50 blocks and has thus accrued
a high level of trust, creates a new block containing one
fake transaction. We use the trust table shown in Fig 2b.
We run the simulation 10 times and attack success is the
percentage of the number of runs that the fake block is
not detected by any of the honest OBMs (this applies to all
evaluations that consider security attacks in the rest of the
paper). We compare the packet overheads incurred in LSB
with a baseline wherein the overlay network is structured
similarly to Bitcoin. Recall that in Bitcoin all overlay nodes
(50 in our case) manage the BC distributedly unlike LSB
where BC management is limited to selected overlay nodes,
i.e., OBMs. Note that, the baseline would always accurately
detect the attack, since all transactions in a block are ver-
ified. The results are shown in Fig 9. Observe that, as the
number of OBMs increases, the likelihood of a successful
attack reduces substantially. As expected, the packet over-
head increases linearly with the number of OBMs. With 13
OBMs, all attacks are successfully detected. However, the
corresponding packet overhead (8497) is significantly lower
than that incurred in the baseline (54177).
The attack success percentage is directly impacted by the
PTV. To study this impact, we evaluate the attack success
percentage for different PTVs in a network with default
configuration with five overlay nodes acting as OBMs.
The reason for choosing five OBMs is to show the effect
of PTV on the attack success. As is evident from Fig 9,
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Fig. 9. Evaluating the impact of the number of OBMs on security and
packet overhead.
the presence of a greater number of OBMs improves the
security considerably and these effects are not as evident.
The results are illustrated in Fig 10. When PTV equals to
100, OBMs verify all transactions in a block, leading to zero
attack success percentage (i.e., the attack is always detected).
As shown in Fig 10, as PTV decreases, the attack success
percentage increases. For the network configuration used in
this simulation, the lowest value of PTV that can guarantee
security is 60. We have repeated the same simulation for
different number of OBMs to determine the smallest value
of PTV for which an attack can always be detected. Table
3 shows the results of the simulation and can be used as a
guideline to configure the trust table (e.g. Fig 2b). A PTV that
is lower than the values in Table 3 will make the network
vulnerable to appending attacks. On the other hand, a larger
value increases the processing time for new blocks (as more
transactions need to be verified) and the packet overhead in
the network.
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Fig. 10. Evaluating the impact of PTV on the ability to detect appending
attacks.
TABLE 3
Minimum PTV for detecting appending attacks as a function of the
number of OBMs.
Number of OBMs 3 5 7 10 13 15 17 20
Minimum PTV 80 60 60 40 20 20 20 10
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4.2.5 DTM performance analysis
The DTM mechanism proposed in Section 2.1.3 aims to dy-
namically adjust the network utilization based on the total
load, i.e., the number of generated transactions. To illustrate
the performance of DTM, we simulate a network with the
default configuration with 13 overlay nodes acting as OBMs.
As classical BCs have fixed throughput (e.g., the Bitcoin BC
has a fixed throughput of 7 transactions per second) there
is no baseline that we can use for comparison. Initially,
a total of 10 cumulative transactions are generated in the
overlay network per second. We simulate situations where
the network demand fluctuates. The number of transactions
per second increases to 32 for the entire time period from
5 seconds to 40 seconds. At 40 seconds, the load increases
further to 44 transactions per second until 45 seconds when
the load drops to 12 transactions per second. The changes
in the network load are illustrated in Fig 11. Recall that
DTM computes the network utilization, α, at the end of each
consensus-period as the ratio between the number of trans-
actions generated and the number of transactions added
to the overlay BC since the last computation of α. Time
intervals when α is computed by OBMs is shown using gray
dots in the figure. The consensus period is initially set to 10
seconds, which is the default value. We assume that αmin
and αmax are set to 0.25 and 1, respectively.
At the end of the first consensus-period (i.e. 10 seconds),
α is computed to be 2.4, which is greater than αmax (1).
This is because of the sharp increase in the network load
at 5 seconds. To reduce the network utilization, DTM re-
duces the consensus-period to the newly computed value
of 2.5 seconds (see lines 2-5 Algorithm 2) using Equation
1, where α is set to 0.62, which is the mid point of αmin
and αmax. The consensus-period is also illustrated in Fig 11.
Subsequently, since the network load remains stable until
40 seconds, the consensus period also remains unchanged.
At this time, the network load increases further. Thus, at
the end of the next consensus-period (43 seconds), α is
computed to be 0.84. As the computed value is still less
than αmax, no further action is required. This highlights
the effectiveness of choosing the mid-point of αmin and
αmax for recomputing α. The value of α drops to 0.2 at
48 seconds resulting from the sharp decrease in the number
of transactions at 45 seconds. Since this value is less than
αmin, DTM increases the consensus-period (see lines 7-
9 Algorithm 2) to a new value, which is computed as 7
seconds.
5 DISCUSSIONS
5.1 Proof of activities
Recall that (Section 2), all transactions pertaining to devices
within a smart home are recorded and stored in the local
IL as a device-specific ledger. This information can be very
useful for auditing purposes, i.e., to precisely track who and
when had access to a specific sensor and its data. In order
to ensure that the local IL has not been tampered with, we
recommend that a hash of it is periodically stored in the
public BC using a single signature transaction (discussed
in Section 2.1). In the following, we outline a use case
demonstrating the auditing functionality. One can readily
envision other scenarios.
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Fig. 11. Evaluation of DTM in the overlay.
Consider a situation where a law enforcement agency
requires proof that a particular individual, say Alice, was
at home during a particular time period, e.g., last night.
Assume that Alice’s home is equipped with a smart doorbell
camera and motion sensors and that all data is stored in the
local storage. The camera would have captured and stored
footage of Alice arriving home on that day and subsequently
leaving her home on the next day. Additionally, the mo-
tion sensors would have also logged Alice’s presence at
home. Alice can thus present this data and the associated
transactions in the IL to the investigators to confirm her
presence at home on that particular night. Additionally, the
investigators can verify the hash of Alice’s IL stored in the
public BC to ensure that the data presented has not been
modified.
5.2 Shared overlay
In instances where an individual is responsible for several
homes (e.g., when he owns multiple homes or is supporting
family members such as elderly parents), managing each
residence separately can multiply the effort. LSB offers the
option of creating a shared overlay to simplify the manage-
ment of multiple smart homes. The manager chooses one
LBM in one home as the Shared BM (ShBM) for all homes.
Other homes in the shared overlay use a Virtual Private
Network (VPN) connection (between the home Internet
gateway and the ShBM) to connect and share data with the
ShBM securely. The ShBM performs the same functions as
the LBM but for all devices in all the homes that are part of
the shared overlay.
5.3 OBM reward
In classical BCs, e.g. Bitcoin or Ethereum, nodes that gener-
ate new blocks are offered a monetary reward in the form
of coins as a form of compensation for expending their
resources to solve the computationally intensive puzzle
associated with block creation. This fee is paid as the trans-
action fee by the users. However, there is now a growing
consensus that for more effective BC the transaction fee
should be removed [30]. LSB employs a lightweight consen-
sus algorithm and thus we do away with explicit rewards
and the transaction fee. Instead, an OBM on generating a
valid block gains reputation with other OBMs (see Section
2), which could be construed as an implicit reward.
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Another way to incentivize OBMs could be to allow
them to place advertisements in the blocks that they append
to the BC. An explicit field within the block header could
be reserved for this purpose. The advertisement is also
included in the block hash which prevents other OBMs
from changing the advertisements. This may be particularly
attractive to service and cloud storage providers.
6 RELATED WORKS
In this section, we provide a literature review on IoT security
and privacy and BC-based systems.
IoT security: Authors in [31] proposed an end-to-end
host identity protocol to secure IoT. The proposed method
reduces the header size of the 6LowPAN and Host Identity
protocol (HIP) from 40 bytes to a maximum of 25 bytes
by eliminating unnecessary header fields and thus reduces
network overhead. The authors also proposed a lightweight
key distribution method for distributing keys between low
resource IoT devices and users. A high resource available
device is placed in the wireless range of the low resource
devices to perform resource consuming tasks on behalf
of the low resource devices. Although their approach is
computationally lightweight for their considered particular
application, removing the 6LowPAN and HIP header fields
leads to reduced functionality. Moreover, the scalability of
this approach is limited due to the fact that the high resource
device must be within wireless range of all IoT devices.
The authors in [32] proposed a new authentication and
access control method to make IoT secure against unautho-
rized users and access. The proposed method relies on two
authentication authorities namely: i) Registration Authority
(RA), and ii) Home Registration Authority (HRA). The RA is
designed to facilitate the authentication process for devices.
All devices are registered with the RA. Similarly, the HRA
facilitates the authentication process for the users. When a
user wishes to access data from a particular device, the re-
quest is first sent to the RA. The RA checks the authenticity
of the user with the HRA. Assuming the user is authen-
ticated, the RA generates a shared key for communication
between the user and the device. Security analysis shows
that the proposed method is secure against the man-in-
the-middle attack. However, the need for each device to
have a RA and correspondingly each user to have a HRA
could be a bottleneck for scalability. In LSB, we have rather
proposed a tiered structure where a single public BC is
managed distributedly by the overlay nodes and the devices
within each smart home are managed independently by a
home-specific LBM. Our approach scales better while also
achieving protection against a broader range of attacks.
BC applications: The notion of a BC was first introduced
in the landmark paper [2] on Bitcoin by Satoshi Nakamoto.
Bitcon aims to do away with centralized authorities for
money exchange while offering a high level of security
and privacy to the users. In 2013 a new BC platform,
called Ethereum, was introduced [3]. Ethereum users are
able to generate smart contracts with a small fee but with
high security and privacy. Several applications have been
proposed in recent years that make use of the Ethereum BC
including BC in agriculture [33], crowd funding [34], and
micro blogging [35].
Numerous other applications of BCs have been proposed
recently. Authors in [36] proposed a novel application of
BC in energy trading. Using their proposed framework,
energy producers can negotiate the selling price with their
customers and also facilitate a smart contract to make a
sale. A Distribution System Operator (DSO) ensures that
the trade is secure and prevents the possibility for either
a producer or customer to not follow through with their
part of the contract. A lock key is used to prevent an energy
producer from double spending (i.e. selling the energy to
more than one customer). Security analysis shows that the
framework is secure to a broad range of attacks. However,
the architecture suffers from low scalability as a result
of broadcasting all transactions and blocks to the whole
network. In LSB, we overcome this challenge by limiting
the number of nodes who manage the BC.
The authors in [37] proposed a BC-based multi-tier
architecture to share data from IoT devices with organi-
zations and people. The proposed architecture has three
main components namely: data management protocol, data
store system, and message service. The data management
protocol provides a framework for data owner, requester, or
data source to communicate with each other. The messaging
system is used to increase the network scalability based on a
publish/subscribe model. Finally, the data store system uses
a BC for storing data privately. As in our work, they do not
rely on POW given the associated overheads. In contrast
to this work, we do not use the BC for storing user data
as it will consume large bandwidth to store data in the
distributed BC. Instead, we store hash of the data in the
cloud in the public BC.
Recently Intel has designed a new consensus algorithm
for BC known as Proof of Elapsed Time (POET) which is
integrated with Hyperledger [38]. POET is a leader election
algorithm which is intended to run in a Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE) in Intel CPUs. Before a node can store
a block in the BC, it must wait for a random time which
is selected from a trusted enclave. A TimeChecker function
verifies the choice of the random time. The block can only
be appended to the BC after this time period. The consensus
protocol (see Section 2.1.1) used in LSB is conceptually
similar to POET. However, LSB does not rely on a particular
hardware platform and is thus more generalized.
The authors in [39] proposed a new ledger based cryp-
tocurrency called IoTA. By eliminating the notion of blocks
and mining, IoTA ensures that the transactions are free
and verification is fast. The key innovation behind IoTA is
the ”tangle”, which is essentially a directed acyclic graph
(DAG). Before a user can send a transaction, he has to verify
two randomly chosen transactions generated by other users.
As the number of nodes increase, the transactions generated
also increase but so do the number of transactions that are
verified. LSB shares some similarities with IoTA such as
zero transaction fees and both realize a self-scaling network.
However, LSB employs a BC unlike the DAG employed by
IoTA. LSB thus benefits from the inherent benefits of a BC
such as the auditability offered by an immutable ledger.
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7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we argued that although BlockChain (BC) is
an effective technology for providing security and privacy
in IoT, its application in the IoT context presents several
significant challenges including: complexity, bandwidth and
latency overheads and scalability. To address these chal-
lenges, we proposed a Lightweight Scalable BC (LSB) for
IoT. LSB has an IoT friendly consensus algorithm that elim-
inates the need for solving any puzzle prior to appending a
block to the BC. LSB incorporates a distributed trust method
whereby the processing time for validating new blocks by
the OBMs gradually decreases as they build up trust in each
other. A distributed throughput management strategy ad-
justs certain system parameters to ensure that the network
utilization is within a prescribed operating range. Security
analysis demonstrates that LSB is highly secure against a
broad range of attacks. In the instance when key nodes fail,
LSB operation exhibits graceful degradation, thus making
it highly fault tolerant. Simulation results show that the
proposed architecture decreases bandwidth and processing
time compared to the classical BCs. Additionally, the smart
home owners receive services with no additional delay for
local transactions (i.e. smart home communications) and
with a small imperceptible delay for the overlay transactions
compared to the state-of-the-art. Generally, LSB brings a
high level of security and privacy for IoT users while en-
forcing a marginal overhead. As the future direction of this
work, one may consider relaxing some of the assumptions
made in LSB, e.g. considering cases when the local block
manager might be compromised.
In our future work, we plan to develop a prototype
implementation of LSB to understand its performance in
real-world settings. We will also explore the suitability of
LSB in other application domains such as smart grids and
vehicular networks.
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